「思考研究の新パラダイム」講演会@立命館大学

以下、高橋も共同研究を行っている(日本学術振興会・フランスANR CHORUSプログラム(平成23年度選定事業)「真と偽を超えて:確信の度合い」、というやつです)、
David Over と Jean Baratgin が立命館大学で講演会を行います。
ふるってご参加下さい。
 
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David Over 教授・Jean Baratgin 教授 講演会
「思考研究の新パラダイム」
 
日時: 2012年9月6日 15:00-17:30
場所: 立命館大学 朱雀キャンパス1F 多目的室
〒604-8520 京都市中京区西ノ京朱雀町1
(JR・地下鉄「二条」徒歩2分,阪急「大宮」徒歩10分)
http://www.ritsumei.jp/accessmap/accessmap_suzaku_j.html

プログラム:
0. イントロダクション
1. Jean Baratgin教授(パリ第8大学)講演
「新パラダイム推論心理学と三値論理」
2. David Over教授(英国ダーラム大学)講演
「作用域曖昧性・様相錯誤と新パラダイム推論心理学」
3. ディスカッション

参加: 申込み不要・入場無料
 
 
講演要旨:
 
New paradigm psychology of reasoning and three-valued logic
 
Jean Baratgin (Paragraphe [Universite Paris 8, Saint-Denis]
& Institut Jean Nicod [ENS, Paris])
 
Two bodies of research in the psychology of reasoning support the new
paradigm. The first result is that most people judge the probability of
a conditional sentence to be equal to the conditional probability of
the consequent on the antecedent (as implied by the Ramsey test). The
second result is very old. It is the existence of a so-called defective
truth table in which people judge irrelevant (`I’) the two cases where
the antecedent is false. Our presentation focuses on this second point.
Uncertainty is a hallmark of the new paradigm. Thus if `I’ is considered
as a third value there is no defective table but rather a coherent table
in which a third truth value that represents uncertainty is introduced.
However a variety of three-valued systems of logic are available. We
examine their descriptive adequacy for the usual connectives, including
the conditional. Within this framework the so-called defective
truth-table in which participants choose a third truth value when the
antecedent of the conditional is false becomes an explainable and
coherent response. Our main result is that the logic of de Finetti (and
only this one) has a very good descriptive adequacy when uncertainty
takes place as a third truth-value.
 
 
Scope ambiguities, modal fallacies, and new paradigm psychology of
reasoning
 
David Over (Psychology Department, Durham University)
 
There is a new Bayesian / probabilistic paradigm in the psychology of
reasoning. It depends on experiments in which participants respond that
the probability of the natural language indicative conditional P(if p
then q) is the conditional probability of q given p. Once this result,
P(if p then q) = P(q|p), is fully established, a Bayesian account of
conditional reasoning, and so of reasoning in general, is sure to
follow. However, the result depends on the participants applying the
probability operator to the whole conditional, in a wide scope
interpretation, and not to its consequent, in a narrow scope
interpretation. The problem is that modal operators like probability can
cause scope ambiguities in natural language and modal fallacies. Scope
ambiguities and the associated modal fallacies are a well researched
topic in logic and philosophy. Yet the psychology of reasoning has paid
little attention to this topic, in spite of its intrinsic interest and
relevance to the new paradigm. We will illustrate how modal fallacies
have been committed by supporters of old paradigm psychology of
reasoning in their response to the evidence for P(if p then q) = P(q|p).
An experimental programme will be described supporting the conclusion
that the probability operator is generally given wide, and not narrow,
scope in conditionals.
 
 
主催: 立命館大学人間科学研究所
文部科学省 私立大学戦略的研究基盤形成支援事業(平成22年度選定事業)
「大学を模擬社会空間とした自立支援のための持続的対人援助モデルの構築」
共催: 日本学術振興会・フランスANR CHORUSプログラム(平成23年度選定事業)
「真と偽を超えて:確信の度合い」
共催: 関西思考研究会
 
問い合わせ先:
山 祐嗣(大阪市大) yama@lit.osaka-cu.ac.jp
服部雅史(立命館大) hat@lt.ritsumei.ac.jp
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